The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience.
Global Supervenience," and "Intermediate Global Supervenience," respectively. 1 I will argue that none of them has the features that we take global supervenience to have.
Since the bearers of properties in A and B are typically not the worlds themselves, but individuals in the domain of these worlds, the notion of two worlds being indiscernible with respect to such a class requires clarification. At a first stab, w and w are A-indiscernible if and only if for every individual x and property F ∈ A, x has F in w if and only if x has F in w . On this account, A-indiscernibility requires that the same individuals exist in the two worlds, and accordingly, pairs of worlds with different domains can never falsify global supervenience claims, even if the domains are of the same size. Since such claims are about the distribution of properties, not about the identity of individuals in different worlds, this account is inadequate.
Before stating an improved version, I want to illustrate why the notion of indiscernibility is less straightforward than it might appear. Suppose that in both w and w , there are exactly two individuals: a red cube and a blue sphere in w, and a blue cube and a red sphere in w . Are w and w alike with respect to colour-properties, and with respect to shape-properties? The answers seem to depend on how we compare w and w . If we pair up the two cubes and the two spheres, respectively, for the purposes of comparison, we will conclude that w and w are alike with respect to shapes, but different with respect to colours. If, on the other hand, we pair up the two blue things and the two red things, respectively, we will conclude that the worlds are alike with respect to colours, but different with respect to shapes 2 .
To introduce the candidates, this talk of pairing up individuals in different worlds needs to be made more precise. Let D w be the domain of individuals of w. A function µ is a domain-isomorphism from world w to world w = d f µ maps D w one-one onto D w . 3 For a class of properties A, µ is an A-isomorphism between w and w = d f µ is a domain-isomorphism from w to w and preserves every property in A, in the sense that for every X ∈ A and every individual x in the domain of w, x has X in w if and only if µ(x) has X in w . 4 Since I dispute that the proposed candidates deserve to be called "global supervenience," I use the more neutral terms "WGS," "IGS," and "SGS" instead of "Weak," "Intermediate," and "Strong Global Supervenience," respectively. The three relations are defined as follows:
WGS A WGS B = d f for all worlds w and w , if there is a B-isomorphism between w and w , there is also an A-isomorphism between w and w .
IGS A IGS B = d f for all worlds w and w , if there is a B-isomorphism between w and w , some B-isomorphism between w and w is also an A-isomorphism. SGS A SGS B = d f for all worlds w and w , every B-isomorphism between w and
w is also an A-isomorphism.
Some philosophers will insist that since 'global supervenience' is itself a term of art, the question what relation it refers to is moot. The meaning of such terms is to be stipulated, not analysed. If it matters in a given philosophical context whether it is WGS, IGS, or SGS that is at issue, we should simply make the appropriate stipulation. Of course, by claiming that each of the relations defined above is distinct from global supervenience, I am not ruling out that they may be otherwise theoretically useful. The use of 'global supervenience' supplies conditions of adequacy for a proposed candidate referent. The proposal must predict particular judgments of global supervenience, and the referent must have the right logical and structural features, such as transitivity. I argue that WGS and IGS are not adequate in Sect. 2, and that SGS is not adequate in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience: some conditions of adequacy are jointly inconsistent. I conclude in Sect. 5 by indicating how extant proposals might be improved upon, while heeding the lesson of the puzzle that no candidate can be perfectly adequate.
Why global supervenience is neither WGS nor IGS
I start by briefly presenting a variation on an argument due to Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004) to the effect that global supervenience is not WGS. Let "Tallest" be the property of being the tallest giraffe if there is one, and the number seven if there isn't. Further, let "Smartest" be the property of being the smartest animal if there is one, and the number nine if there isn't. In every world, Tallest and Smartest are had by exactly one individual. Hence there are {Tallest}-isomorphisms and {Smartest}-isomorphisms between any worlds whose domains have the same cardinality. Thus {Tallest} and {Smartest} bear WGS to every class of properties. In particular, they bear it to each other. However, clearly they do not globally supervene on each other, since the distribution of one does not fix the distribution of the other. 5 That {F} bears WGS to B could be paraphrased as follows: the distribution of B fixes how many things have F. In contrast, global supervenience is the far stronger claim that the distribution of B fixes the distribution of F. This is one argument that shows that WGS is not global supervenience. At the end of this section, I will present a second argument for the same conclusion. It will be a straightforward extension of my case against the claims of IGS to be global supervenience, to which I now turn.
The relation IGS, introduced into the discussion by Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004) , holds between A and B if whenever there is a B-isomorphism between w and w , some B-isomorphism is also an A-isomorphism. It is stronger than WGS, but weaker than SGS. IGS is a prima facie attractive candidate for being the referent of the concept of global supervenience, since it is not vulnerable to either the above objection against the candidacy of WGS, or the objections against the candidacy of SGS to be discussed in the next section.
Consider the above objection, in the version that invokes the classes {Tallest} and {Smartest}. (The same response on behalf of IGS can be given, mutatis mutandis, to other versions.) These classes of properties do not bear IGS to each other. For there is a possible world w in which the tallest giraffe t w is also the smartest animal, and there is a domain-isomorphic possible world w in which the tallest giraffe t w and the smartest animal s w are distinct. Clearly, there is a {Smartest}-isomorphism between w and w . Every {Smartest}-isomorphism maps t w to s w , while every {Tallest}-isomorphism maps t w to t w . Since t w and s w are distinct, there is no {Smartest}-isomorphism that is also a {Tallest}-isomorphism between w and w . Hence we get the desired result, which we note for future reference:
(1) It is not the case that {Tallest} IGS {Smartest}. Thus IGS avoids the problem for WGS. Nor is it beset by the problem that SGS faces, to be discussed in the next section. So far, so good for IGS. 6 However, I now argue that the candidacy of IGS faces serious problems of its own.
It is part of the inferential role of the concept of global supervenience that it stands for a relation that is transitive, monotonic, and "accumulative" in the sense defined below. (For simplicity, I sometimes omit the qualification 'global', which is intended unless indicated otherwise.)
Transitivity If A supervenes on B and B supervenes on C, then A supervenes on C. 7 Unless Transitivity holds, we cannot conclude, for example, that the biological properties supervene on the physical ones from the premises that the biological properties supervene on the chemical and the chemical on the physical ones.
Monotonicity If A supervenes on a subclass B of B , then it also supervenes on B itself. Unless Monotonicity holds, we cannot conclude that the chemical properties supervene on the class of all physical properties from the premise that they supervene on some class of physical properties.
6 Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004) both argue that in some sense it fails to be a genuine determination relation. However, these arguments do not directly bear on the question whether IGS is global supervenience, for these authors do not take it for granted that global supervenience is a genuine determination relation. 7 For example, Bennett and McLaughlin (2005, Sect. 3 .2) assert that supervenience (in general, not just global supervenience) is transitive.
Strictly speaking, Transitivity, like Monotonicity and Accumulativity below, is universally quantified with respect to classes of properties A, B, and C.
Accumulativity If A and C each supervene on B, then A ∪ C supervenes on B.
Unless Accumulativity holds, we cannot conclude that all properties supervene on physical properties from the premises that the mental properties supervene and that the non-mental properties supervene.
The relation IGS is neither transitive, nor monotonic, nor accumulative. If 'supervenes' is replaced by 'bears IGS', each of the three statements above becomes false. I will obtain counterexamples to all of them by instantiating A with {Tallest}, B with {Self-Identity}, B with {Self-Identity, Smartest}, and C with {Smartest}.
Together with (1) above, the following two claims entail that IGS is not transitive:
Self-Identity is the property that everything has in every world in which it exists. To prove (2), suppose there is a {Self-Identity}-isomorphism µ between w and w . Define µ T as follows: if x is the unique individual t w which has Tallest in w, µ T (x) is the unique individual t w which has Tallest in w ; if
Then µ T is a {Self-Identity}-isomorphism which also preserves {Tallest}, which establishes (2). (3) follows from the observations that every {Smartest}-isomorphism is a domainisomorphism, and every domain-isomorphism is a {Self-Identity}-isomorphism. (2), (3), and (1) show that IGS is not transitive.
A counterexample to the monotonicity of IGS is provided by (2) together with (4):
(4) It is not the case that {Tallest} IGS {Smartest, Self-Identity}.
As in the argument for (1), we consider a world w where the same individual has Tallest and Smartest, and a world w where these properties are had by distinct individuals. (4) then follows from the observation that while there is a {Smartest, Self-Identity}-isomorphism between w and w , no domain-isomorphism will preserve {Tallest, Smartest, Self-Identity}. Finally, (2), (5), and (6) together entail that IGS is not accumulative:
If we replace 'Tallest' in the proof of (2) with 'Smartest', we obtain a proof of (5). (6) can be established by the same type of argument as (1) and (4). Since it is neither transitive nor monotonic nor accumulative, IGS lacks three formal properties needed to account for the inferential role of the concept of global supervenience. Thus even though it avoids the objections mounted against the candidacy of WGS and SGS, IGS is not global supervenience.
As I announced above, the type of argument deployed here can be used to undermine the credentials of WGS as a supervenience relation even further. To be sure, it is straightforward to prove that WGS is transitive and monotonic. But WGS is not accumulative, the following triple being a counterexample.
(9) It is not the case that {Tallest, Smartest} WGS {Smartest}.
(7) obviously follows from the definition of WGS, and (8) was established in the first paragraph of this section. To see why (9) holds, recall that the argument for (1) shows that there are worlds w and w between which there is a {Smartest}-isomorphism, but no {Tallest, Smartest}-isomorphism. Hence WGS is not accumulative, and definitely is not global supervenience.
Why global supervenience is not SGS
The relation SGS does not face any of the objections raised against WGS or IGS as explications of global supervenience. It is easily seen to be transitive, monotonic, and accumulative, and unlike WGS, it is not too weak. However, it can be argued that SGS is stronger than global supervenience.
Bennett (2004) put the objection along the following lines: SGS is incompatible with so-called "intraworld variation" of individuals. Global supervenience, in contrast, allows that individuals differ in their A-properties but not their B-properties, while ruling out that worlds differ in the former but not the latter. That is just the respect in which the global variety is different from non-global, or individual supervenience. Bennett (2004, p. 521) writes that "everyone has always taken global supervenience to allow intraworld variation; that is one of its standardly recognized. . .features". Here I want to present a version of that objection that I find particularly compelling.
To falsify the claim that A globally supervenes on B, what is required is a pair of possible worlds with the same pattern of distribution of B and different such patterns of A. If no two worlds share the pattern of distribution of B, there can be no such pair, and then any class A globally supervenes on B-B is a global supervenience base for everything.
In the terminology used here, to say that no two possible worlds share the pattern of distribution of B is to say that there is no B-isomorphism between any w and w , or that no worlds w and w are B-isomorphic. Thus it is a further principle of adequacy for an explication of global supervenience that it vindicates the following principle:
FPP If no two possible worlds are B-isomorphic, then every class of properties globally supervenes on B.
I choose to call this principle "FPP" or "Finest Partition Principle" because it can be paraphrased as follows: if a class of properties induces a maximally fine partition on the space of possible worlds, then it is a supervenience base for everything. WGS satisfies FPP: if there is no B-isomorphism between any w and w , the material conditional 'if there is a B-isomorphism, then there is an A-isomorphism' is true because its antecedent is false. 8 Mutatis mutandis, the same argument shows that IGS satisfies FPP. However, we cannot prove that SGS satisfies FPP. Indeed, given fairly modest assumption about what the modal facts are, we can show that it does not.
Let FUND be a class of fundamental properties such that any two possible worlds differ in how the members of FUND are distributed-no two worlds are FUND-isomorphic. Then SGS fails to satisfy FPP if there is a class A that displays intraworld variation with respect to FUND. I now need to clarify the pertinent notion of intraworld variation, and to argue that there is such a class A.
Roughly, x and y make for intraworld variation in A if they differ in their A-properties even though they do not only share their own FUND-properties, but also their "world-perspective" (Sider 1999 ) with respect to FUND. More precisely, A displays intraworld variation with respect to FUND in w if and only if there is a FUND-isomorphism from w to itself that does not preserve A. 9 How can we argue that there are classes that display intraworld variation with respect to FUND? I offer three examples, each one relying on different assumptions.
First, suppose that numbers neither instantiate fundamental properties themselves, nor bear fundamental relations to anything that instantiates them. Then no two numbers differ in FUND, and there is a FUND-isomorphism from w to itself that maps the number seven to the number nine, and vice versa (we may assume that it maps every concrete thing to itself). Then a property like primeness, which is had by seven but not by nine, does not bear SGS to FUND.
For a second example, suppose that the members of FUND obey some combinatorial principle, as a consequence of which certain symmetrical distributions are possible. There may be reflection symmetry along a spatial axis, or temporal translation symmetry, as in a world of two-way eternal recurrence. If w is such a world, there are distinct individuals x and y and a FUND-isomorphism µ from w to itself such that µ(x) = y. Thus any A that differs between x and y fails to bear SGS to FUND. For instance, if A contains a haecceitistic property only had by x or y, it does not bear SGS to FUND.
Third, assume that all possible worlds, or at least all possible worlds we are quantifying over, have an atomic mereology. Let P S include all intrinsic properties that can only be had by mereological simples, and intrinsic relations in which only simples can stand. For instance, P S may include the properties of being an electron or a positron, or conjunctive properties like having unit negative charge and being simple, or having a mass of 1 g and being simple. Then it is a substantive question whether all classes of properties globally supervene on P S . (Bells and whistles aside, it is the question whether Humean supervenience holds (Lewis 1986) .) If there is no P S -isomorphism between any two worlds, then surely P S is a global supervenience base for everything. But consider a domain-isomorphism µ from w to itself that maps every simple to itself, but maps the fusion of simples x and y to the fusion of simples x, y, and z. Clearly, µ preserves P S , but does not preserve the property of having two simple parts, 9 To put things differently: A SGS B rules out that world-mates differ in their A-properties even though they agree on all properties and relations definable from those in B. (For x and y share all the properties that are definable from B in the relevant way if and only if there is a B-isomorphism that maps x to y.) This is a consequence of the following result due to Stalnaker (1996, pp. 104-105) : if B* consists of the properties and relations definable from B in an infinitary language with truth-functional operators, quantifiers, and identity, then A SGS B is equivalent to the claim that A strongly supervenes on B*. (A strongly supervenes on B if and only if x in w and x in w are B-duplicates, they are also A-duplicates.) as well as many other properties. Trivially, then, it is not the case that every class of properties bears SGS to P S . 10 Each one of these examples, designed to show that SGS fails to satisfy FPP, relies on some assumptions about what properties there are, and what the modal facts are. Even though these assumptions are perhaps more controversial than those used in exposing inadequacies in WGS and IGS, they are still fairly modest. In any case, the satisfaction of a principle like FPP should not be hostage to their falsity.
A puzzle about global supervenience
To sum up the discussion so far: WGS is not accumulative, and {F} WGS B only entails that the distribution of B fixes how many things are F, not that it fixes how they are distributed. IGS is neither transitive, nor monotonic, nor accumulative. SGS, given modest background assumptions, does not satisfy FPP. All three relations thus lack an important feature of global supervenience.
Since none of the candidates proposed in the literature is adequate, the question arises whether there is a candidate that satisfies all criteria? In this section, I present a puzzle that suggests a negative answer. I motivate further adequacy conditions, and argue that they cannot be jointly satisfied. I will explain the crucial notion of a permutation below.
It is a further adequacy condition on an explication that it vindicates our judgements about whether global supervenience holds or not between between particular classes of properties. The puzzle then brings to the fore an inconsistency between Permutation Invariance and pairs of such judgements, given certain background assumptions about what the modal facts are. Using schematic letters in the place of names for particular classes of properties, the puzzle consists in the inconsistency of Permutation Invariance with the following three claims (mnemonic for 'permutation-related', 'supervenience', and 'non-supervenience', respectively): P There is a permutation σ such that A = σ A and B = σ B. S A globally supervenes on B. N A does not globally supervene on B .
Permutation Invariance and P entail that A globally supervenes on B if and only if A globally supervenes on B , which is inconsistent with S and N.
Below I present two instances of that puzzle: classes A, B, A , and B of which P, S, and N all seem to hold. It will turn out that denying P, which does not concern global supervenience, is not promising. The upshot of the puzzle will be that one of the three claims involving global supervenience has to go.
Before defining the notion of a permutation used in stating Permutation Invariance, I want to motivate that condition informally. It encapsulates a claim about what is not relevant to whether A globally supervenes on B or not. Heuristically, it is useful to ask what we need to know about modal space in order to be able to know whether A globally supervenes on B. Clearly, we need to know, for each world, the pattern in which A and B are distributed. This includes knowledge of facts of the following form, for every world: there are individuals x 1 , . . . , x n , properties and relations that (x 1 , . . . , x m , X 1 , . . . , X n , Y 1 However, I claim that facts of that sort are all we need to know to answer the question whether A globally supervenes on B. There are many other things that we might know about A and B, but they are irrelevant to that question. For example, it is irrelevant what expressions, if any, we use to denote the properties in A and B, or whether the members of these classes are natural or not. Moreover, it is irrelevant how any property F that is not a member of either A or B is distributed relative to them.
The irrelevance of such factors reflects the fact that global supervenience is a formal, broadly logical relation. It is this feature that enables global supervenience to play a useful role in regimenting some parts of philosophical discourse. Philosophers with widely differing metaphysical views about the nature and abundance of properties can all help themselves to the idiom of supervenience to express agreement, or to separate out disagreement about a particular subject matter (consciousness, say) from disagreement about the metaphysics of properties. 11 Permutation Invariance is motivated by combining the claim that global supervenience is a logical notion with the claim that logical notions are those that are invariant under permutations of the domain. According to an influential view in the philosophy of logic, notably associated with Tarski (1986) , logical notions can be characterized as those that display such invariance. 12 To support Permutation Invariance, I only need the weaker claim that invariance is a necessary condition, though possibly not sufficient condition for logicality.
For present purposes, let a permutation σ be a function that permutes the domain D w of every possible world: σ maps x, w with x ∈ D w to an individual, in such a 11 Sometimes logic is taken to be concerned with language and concepts, while metaphysics is concerned with the world. This is not the contrast that I have in mind when I call supervenience a "broadly logical" notion. Of course, supervenience relates classes of properties, not symbols. It is logical roughly in the sense that it is concerned with form or structure: it depends merely on the pattern of distribution of the properties in the relevant classes, not on their intrinsic nature. 12 The idea was inspired by Felix Klein's Erlangen Program, which characterized the subject matter of geometrical theories by the class of mappings under which its concepts are invariant. The permutation invariance condition for logical concepts was advocated by Mautner (1946) and then by Tarski in a lecture in 1966 from which the posthumous Tarski (1986) is derived. It was subsequently elaborated and defended in Sher (1991). way that for a given world w, σ w (defined by σ w (x) = σ (x, w)) is a one-one mapping from D w onto itself.
A permutation can be extended to a (possibly partial) function on properties and classes of properties. If F is a property and σ a permutation, σ F, if it exists, is the property that satisfies the following condition for every world w: x has σ F in w if and only if σ −1 (x) has F in w. If A is a class of properties, σ A, if it exists, is {σ F : F ∈ A}. 13 Permutation Invariance, as stated above, is the claim that a permutation σ preserves both global supervenience and non-supervenience: A globally supervenes on B if and only if σ A globally supervenes on σ B (for a permutation σ for which σ A and σ B exist). 14 Permutation Invariance is satisfied by WGS, IGS, and SGS, the extant proposals for explicating global supervenience. 15 An instance of the puzzle presents classes of properties A, B, A , and B of which P, S, and N all hold. I propose two such instances.
A mathematical instance
Let "Seven" denote the property of being the number seven. As before, Tallest is the property of being the tallest giraffe if there is one, and else the number seven. 16 Then each instance of the above triad appears to be true (the subscript is mnemonic for 'Arithmetical'):
P A There is a permutation σ such that {Seven} = σ {Tallest} and {Self-Identity} = σ {Self-Identity}. S A {Seven} globally supervenes on {Self-Identity}. N A {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Self-Identity}.
Together with Permutation Invariance, P A entails that {Seven} globally supervene on {Self-Identity} if and only if {Tallest} does, which is inconsistent with S A and N A . P A relies only on the assumption that there is a unique number seven, and that it exists necessarily. Define σ (x) to be the number seven if x has Tallest in w, to be the individual which has Tallest if x is the number seven, and to be x in all other cases. 13 In general, we should not assume that there is no more than one property satisfying that condition, since properties may be more fine-grained than intensions. However, in the context of a discussion of supervenience, such an assumption is harmless. Properties that share their intension surely do not differ in what supervenience claims are true about them. Hence we can work with a properties that are no more fine-grained than intensions. 14 It can be shown that there is a permutation σ such that A = σ A and B = σ B if and only if a pattern description (of the form given above) is realized by a possible world just in case is realized by a possible world (where results from by replacing A with A and B with B ). Hence Permutation Invariance entails that if exactly the same pattern description are possible for A, B and A , B , then A globally supervenes on B if and only if A globally supervenes on B . 15 This is straightforwardly verified by invoking the following fact: given a permutation σ and worlds w and w , * defined by µ* = σ w • µ • σ −1 w maps the class of domain-isomorphisms from w to w one-one onto itself, in such a way that for any class of properties A, µ preserves A if and only if µ* preserves σ A. 16 The argument would equally go through with Smartest instead of Tallest. Of course, it is not crucial for the example that Tallest is had by the number seven in worlds where there is no tallest giraffe. What matters is only that the property is had by exactly one thing in each world.
The function thus defined is a permutation σ such that {Seven} = σ {Tallest} and {Self-Identity} = σ {Self-Identity}.
There is a strong prima facie case for S A . While it is perhaps not a paradigm of a supervenience claim, it follows from a widely accepted principle: that what is necessary supervenes on anything. Seven is a necessary property in the following sense: if something has it, it has it necessarily, and if something lacks it, it lacks it necessarily. In general, mathematical properties are necessary, and thus supervene on anything. It is partly because of this feature that many philosophers deploy supervenience in their explication of physicalism. Such philosophers typically take physicalism to be compatible with the existence of non-contingent entities, such as numbers and other abstracta. An explication of the view as the claim that everything supervenes on physical properties shares this compatibility.
There is also a strong prima facie claim for N A . Intuitively, the distribution of selfidentity does not uniquely fix the distribution of Tallest: knowing which things are self-identical does not enable us to know which giraffe is the tallest in a world. To offer a different argument for the same conclusion: {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Smartest}: there are possible worlds that are alike with respect to relative smartness of animals, but different with respect to relative heights of giraffes. Likewise, {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Smartest, Self-Identity}. By monotonicity, it follows that {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Self-Identity}.
Which one of Permutation Invariance, P A , S A , and N A should we give up to restore consistency and retain a useful notion of global supervenience? It would be no good to give up P A , even for a philosopher with heterodox views about the modal status of mathematics. For the consistent use of the concept of global supervenience should not be hostage to such views. In my view, N A is likewise non-negotiable. A relation that holds between {Tallest} and {Self-Identity}, or indeed {Tallest} and the empty class, is far too weak to serve as the referent of our concept of global supervenience. The choice is thus between Permutation Invariance and S A . Before discussing candidate explications that give up one or the other of those in the next section, I present a second instance, which shows that the puzzle does not only arise in connection with mathematical properties. Again, we obtain instances of P, S, and N above that appear to be true (the subscript is mnemonic for "Mass" or "Mereological"):
P M There is a permutation σ such that {Supercharge} = σ {Supermass} and M S = σ M S . S M {Supermass} globally supervenes on M S . N M {Supercharge} does not globally supervene on M S . Together with Permutation Invariance, P M entails that {Supermass} globally supervenes on {Self-Identity} if and only if {Supercharge} does, which is inconsistent with S M and N M .
Assume that in every world, neither the individual with the second-largest mass nor the one with the largest positive charge are mereologically simple, and that the numbers 9 and 11 do not have a mass, nor stand in spatiotemporal relations. Then the permutation σ that swaps the individuals with Supermass and Supercharge and leaves everything else alone is such that {Supercharge} = σ {Supermass} and M S = σ M S . 18 Hence P M holds.
There is a strong prima facie case for S M , if we suppose that every world has an atomic mereology (I return to this supposition below). Mass is additive: the mass of an individual is the sum of the masses of its non-overlapping parts. The distribution of mass among the mereologically simple individuals thus fixes, or determines, the distribution of mass among all individuals. 19 There is also a strong prima facie case for N M . The class M S does not include determinates of positive charge. Presumably, positive charge can vary independently from mass. Hence the distribution of M S does not determine the distribution of positive charge, and neither of Supercharge.
Again, we face the question which one of the four incompatible claims we should give up. P M is safe, given how Supermass and Supercharge are defined. N M , like N A in the mathematical instance, seems non-negotiable. As before, the choice is thus between Permutation Invariance and the instance of S.
Before proceeding, I need to comment on the controversial supposition under which S M was argued for: that every world has an atomic mereology. The supposition is essential to the argument. If some worlds have a non-atomic, or "gunky" mereology, S M will fail. For then two worlds may differ in how mass is distributed, while having the same distribution of M S simply because nothing in them instantiates any member of M S . Can we therefore respond to the present instance of the puzzle by denying that every world has an atomic mereology? In my view, such a response would be unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, because the use of the concept of global supervenience should not be hostage to substantive possibility claims of that kind. Second, because 18 More formally, σ is defined as follows: σ (x, w) is (i) the individual which has Supercharge in w whenever x has Supermass in w, (ii) the individual which has Supermass in w whenever x has Supercharge in w, and (iii) x if x has neither Supermass nor Supercharge in w. 19 I am assuming that any two worlds that agree on M S agree on which things have a mereological fusion. I will not defend this assumption here, nor make it formally precise. See also footnote 9. the present instance of the puzzle could arguably be modified to accommodate gunky mereology. We could replace M S by a class M S that includes not only properties and relations had by simples, but also by things that are relatively small, say under one cubic-meter in volume. Then we arguably still get three claims that are jointly inconsistent with Permutation Invariance: there is a permutation σ that maps M S to itself and {Supermass} to {Supercharge}; {Supermass} globally supervenes on M S ; and {Supercharge} does not globally supervene on M S . The class of properties chosen for a modified argument would have to be tailored to a particular background view about what the modal facts are. But I am confident that given a view about these facts, an instance of the puzzle can be constructed. Thus while S M may well have to be given up in the end, the puzzle is not dissolved by rejecting the controversial supposition used in my particular way of setting it up.
Better candidate explications?
I have tried to motivate various criteria of adequacy for an explication of global supervenience, and argued that they cannot all be satisfied. If I am right, there is no perfectly adequate candidate. Still, we may ask whether there are explications that are more adequate than WGS, IGS, and SGS. In this section, I introduce new candidates and briefly mention some of their strengths and weaknesses. However, a full discussion of their respective merits is beyond the scope of this paper.
As noted, SGS is stronger than global supervenience. Still, its definition can be modified in such a way as to produce weaker candidates. Its logical form is that of a universal quantification: for all functions µ and worlds w and w , if µ is a B-isomorphism between w and w , it is also an A-isomorphism between w and w . There is a well-known method for modifying universally quantified claims that are stronger than we want: restricting the domain of quantification, either explicitly or implicitly. Since logical features do not depend on what the domain is, they are unaffected by such a modification. Relations defined by restricting the domain of functions quantified over are weaker than SGS, but crucially, they are still transitive, monotonic, and accumulative. 20 In Sect. 3, I showed that SGS does not satisfy FPP: that no two worlds are B-isomorphic does not entail that B is an SGS-base for everything. The failure of that entailment was established by appeal to domain-isomorphisms from a world to itself. This suggest a distinctness constraint on the domain-isomorphisms quantified over:
SGS D A TSGS B = d f for all distinct worlds w and w , every B-isomorphism between w and w is also an A-isomorphism.
If no two worlds are B-isomorphic, then there is no B-isomorphism between distinct worlds that could fail to be an A-isomorphism, and hence every class A bears SGS D to B. SGS D thus satisfies FPP. 21 SGS not only fails to satisfy FPP, but also S A and S M . {Seven} does not bear SGS to {Self-Identity}, as can be shown by appeal to domain-isomorphisms that do not map numbers to themselves. Likewise, {Supermass} does not bear SGS to M S , as can be shown by appeal to domain-isomorphisms under which the image of a fusion of parts is not the fusion of the images of these parts. This suggests a preservation constraint: that the domain-isomorphism preserve the relations of membership and parthood, i.e. that x ∈ y in w if and only if µ(x) ∈ µ(y) in w , and x is a part of y in w if and only if µ(x) is a part of µ(y) in w :
SGS P A SGS P B = d f for all worlds w and w , every B-isomorphism between w and w that preserves membership and parthood is also an A-isomorphism.
Given the assumptions mentioned in the last section (atomic mereology, additivity of mass), SGS P satisfies S M ; and given a set-theoretic reduction of numbers, it satisfies S A . Like SGS, it satisfies N A and N M . The price it has to pay is the violation of Permutation Invariance. Adding both the distinctness and the preservation constraint yields the following proposal:
SGS D P A SGS D P B = d f for all distinct worlds w and w , every B-isomorphism
between w and w that preserves membership and parthood is also an A-isomorphism.
For each of the three relations SGS D , SGS P , and SGS D P , defending its credentials as an explication of global supervenience would involve two challenges. A defense of SGS D would need to explain that giving up S A and S M is the best response to the puzzle of the last section, and that the distinctness constraint is not ad hoc.
A defense of SGS P would need to explain that giving up Permutation Invariance by privileging relations such as membership and parthood is the best response to the puzzle, and that FPP is negotiable.
A defense of SGS D P would need to explain that giving up Permutation Invariance is the best response to the puzzle, and that the distinctness constraint is not ad hoc.
However, an assessment of the respective merits of these three relations is beyond the scope of this article, as is a discussion of further ways in which one might modify extant proposals. 22 In conclusion: The concept of global supervenience may be more problematic, and less straightforwardly understood, than we might have thought, and it may not give us all we wanted. Nonetheless, I do not wish to suggest that it is not a valuable tool.
It may have its limitations, but so do all tools. The better we know them, the more appropriate our use of it will be.
